Electronic Transmission of results can’t end electoral fraud — Groups warn

2026-02-22 - 05:25

By Anayo Okoli Amid ongoing debates over the adoption of electronic transmission of election results for the 2027 general elections, the Centre for Contemporary Studies (CCS) and the Nigeria Diaspora Coalition for Change (NDCfC) have cautioned that the technology alone cannot eliminate electoral fraud in Nigeria. The groups stressed the complex relationship between technology and democracy, noting that systems that succeed in commerce may not automatically guarantee credibility in electoral processes. In a joint statement signed by CCS Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Yusuf Musa, and NDCfC Chairman, Prof. Adenike Grange, they acknowledged Nigeria’s evolving democratic system and the need to build trust in electoral institutions. “We make these statements recognizing that our democracy is still young and going through a growing phase. The integrity of our elections can go a long way toward establishing us as the true giants of the Black race. Our intervention focuses on our technical responsibility to ensure we can trust the systems,” the statement read. The groups emphasized that election data carries constitutional authority and must be treated differently from routine transactional systems such as POS networks or examination platforms. “The issue is not merely whether data can move electronically, but whether it can move with forensic integrity,” they said. They warned that data remains vulnerable throughout its lifecycle — at rest, in use, and in motion — stressing that any credible electoral architecture must address all three simultaneously. Otherwise, electronic transmission risks relocating distrust rather than eliminating it. While acknowledging that advocates of electronic transmission prioritize verifiability over discretion, the groups recommended a dedicated or hybrid network infrastructure, combining private backbone systems with public redundancy. They also proposed layered protections, including device-level signing, end-to-end encryption, hash verification, mirrored servers, and immutable audit logs. “The goal is not secrecy of the data, but immutability of the record. Even if seen, it must not be alterable without detection,” the statement noted. The groups further highlighted the national security implications of election data, describing it as a potential target for both state and non-state actors. However, they observed that Nigeria’s historical vulnerabilities have stemmed more from human interference during physical collation than from remote cyber intrusions. They framed the challenge as one of comparative risk: centralized cyber manipulation versus distributed human manipulation — noting that while neither is impossible, one is easier to detect and prove. According to the statement, electronic transmission should not be treated as a cure-all for electoral distrust. “Without institutional independence, transparent auditing, and rapid judicial resolution, technology becomes theatre. But without verifiable transmission, every other reform still collapses at the collation stage.” The groups called on the Independent National Electoral Commission to publicly test, certify, and demonstrate the reliability of any transmission system before elections, rather than defending it afterward. They concluded that the national conversation should shift from “trust the technology” to “verify the evidence.”